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A Commentary on
Interaction in SpokenWord Recognition Models: Feedback Helps
by Magnuson, J. S., Mirman, D., Luthra, S., Strauss, T., and Harris, H. D. (2018). Front. Psychol.
9:369. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00369
Magnuson et al. (2018: MMLSH), responding to Norris et al. (2016: NMC16), postulate that
feedback of activation from words to pre-lexical representations is helpful in spoken-word
recognition. Their argument (1) is flawed by being bound to a particular class of model, (2) misses
the central point about parsimony in recognition models, and (3) ignores crucial data.
(1) MMLSH describe simulations with the interactive-activation model TRACE (McClelland and
Elman, 1986). Activation feedback is a key feature of TRACE: activation feeds back from word-
form representations to influence the activation of pre-lexical phoneme representations. The
simulations show that (for most though not all words) feedback improves word recognition
when noise is added to the input. As we will argue, however, this demonstration has no bearing
on the larger theoretical question of whether activation feedback is necessary, or even helpful,
in speech recognition (Norris et al., 2000: NMC00; NMC16). The MMLSH simulations do not
show that activation feedback necessarily improves word recognition because showing that it
helps TRACE does not entail that it will help other models.
If the frequency of all words is assumed to be the same, then the best that any speech recognition
system can do is compute the match between input features and lexical representations and select
the best-matching word (more specifically, pick the word with the maximum likelihood). Since
words differ in frequency, however, priors are available. The task is then to compute the posterior
probability of the words as the product of the likelihood and prior (i.e., use Bayes’ rule). This is how
Shortlist B (Norris and McQueen, 2008: NM08) works. Shortlist B is feedforward and, by virtue
of implementing Bayesian inference, performs optimally; its use of Bayes’ rule guarantees that the
best-matching word must be recognized.
Why then can TRACE benefit from feedback? The inescapable conclusion is that TRACE does
not perform optimally, as just defined. This is not surprising. TRACE’s internal currency is not
probability, but activation. As one of the developers of TRACE explained (McClelland, 1991, 2013),
interactive-activation models do not compute posterior probabilities. Instead, the decision about
which word is present depends on a response threshold set on the output of the Luce choice rule.
Reaching this threshold depends on differences among the activations of different candidate words.
Crucially, because there is no internal noise, feedback has free rein to amplify these differences in
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arbitrary ways. These activation values therefore do not reflect
the posterior probabilities of words. Contrary toMMLSH’s claim,
TRACE’s behavior is thus neither optimal nor Bayesian. In an
optimal system operating on noisy input without the Luce choice
rule, feedback will amplify both signal and noise, and hence will
achieve nothing.
Indeed, as MMLSH’s simulations show, adding feedback
to TRACE has little effect when there is no noise in the
input. Rather, what feedback does is protect the model’s
speed and accuracy against the negative effects of increasing
noise: feedback from word to phoneme nodes amplifies initial
differences in phoneme-node activations and this in turn
amplifies differences in word-node activations, counteracting the
reductions in those differences that increasing noise has caused.
This helps TRACE because its initial behavior is suboptimal,
but says nothing about the need to include feedback in other
models.
MMLSH’s discussion about whether activation feedback
causes “hallucinations” is also model-specific. Activation
feedback does not cause listeners to hallucinate indiscriminately,
but it does run the risk of creating hallucinations (NMC00,
NMC16). Parameters in TRACE can be adjusted to avoid
these negative effects, but, as McClelland et al. (2014)
showed, it takes a very different kind of interactive-activation
model to behave in a fully Bayesian way. A model built
from the start on Bayesian principles would need no such
parameter tweaking and would always behave optimally
anyway.
(2) MMLSH argue that, on a count of nodes and connections,
models with activation feedback are simpler than those
without it. TRACE actually performs very badly in such a
count because of massive reduplication of nodes over time
slices (Norris, 1994); this is why MMSLH had to exclude
many activated nodes to keep their simulations within bounds
(p. 5). If number of parameters is the metric used, Bayesian
models (because of their strong principles) need far fewer free
parameters than interactive-activation models (7 as opposed
to 16, comparing the Bayes-basedMerge B with the activation-
based Merge A; NM08). The divergent performance of
different metrics only emphasizes the pointlessness of making
claims about the relative complexity of different models in
an informal and arbitrary manner; such comparisons should
be formal (c.f. Vandekerckhove et al., 2015) and use fully-
specified models, as in the Merge A/B case.
Also on parsimony, MMLSH misinterpret NMC00’s:
“Information flow from word processing to these earlier
stages is not required by the logic of speech recognition and
cannot replace the necessary flow of information from sounds
to words. Thus it could only be included [. . . ] as an additional
component” (NMC00, p. 299). MMLSH curiously read “not
required by logic” as “illogical” (Is loving your spouse required
by logic? Certainly not, but that does not make it illogical).
An accurate reading of “not required by logic” is, of course,
“not necessary”, and this is the central point about parsimony:
additional components should only be added if it is strictly
necessary to do so. MMSLH do not address this point.
(3) Crucial behavioral evidence is inconsistent with activation
feedback (McQueen et al., 2009; Kingston et al., 2016).
MMLSH fail to discuss this evidence. MMSLH note
neuroscientific findings, but such evidence is inconclusive, as
it could arise from other types of feedback (e.g., for learning or
binding; NMC16). These other types of feedback are helpful,
may indeed be necessary in speech recognition, and, in some
cases, are supported by evidence (e.g., feedback for learning,
Norris et al., 2003). Activation feedback is the only type with
a function that is not self-evident and which is confuted by
existing evidence.
Theoretical arguments and the available empirical data thus
indicate that activation feedback is not necessary in on-line
speech recognition. Indeed, activation feedback is unable to
improve the already optimal performance of any Bayesian
feedforward model.
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